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ABSTRACT 
 
The objectives of this research were; (1) to analyze production efficiency and 
profitability of smallholder rubber monoculture and smallholder rubber agroforestry 
systems, and (2) to find out the effects of policy distortions towards rubber 
production under smallholder monoculture and smallholder agroforestry. 
Smallholders are not only judged by yield per hectare; economic efficiency is not 
only a matter of returns to land and returns to labor but smallholders can adopt low 
input strategy, continue making profits at prices that would be economically viable. 
Such flexibility offers the possibility of efficient resource allocation in response to 
diversification of economic opportunities.  The policy analysis matrix (PAM) with the 
domestic resource cost (DRC) results under the baseline scenario indicated that 
the use of domestic resources in production of rubber was efficient and socially 
profitable under the two systems but more desirable under monoculture system 
given the current prices for physical inputs, outputs, technologies and policy 
transfer. However, even with sensitivity analysis of 10% increase in the price of 
rubber holding other factors constant does not make rubber agroforestry system 
more efficient than its counterpart and a 20% fall in price of rubber made rubber 
production under agroforestry system less efficient and undesirable.  All measures 
are compared to the alternative policy indicators currently used. Therefore, 
recommendations made from this study relate to the need for diversification into 
better practices that can sustain efficient rubber production under the agroforestry 
system, encouraging private sector participation and reducing disincentives to 
rubber production. 
 
Key words: smallholder rubber agroforestry, economic efficiency, policy analysis 
matrix 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The uniqueness of agroforestry system has been documented in many 
reports. Torquebiau (1984), Mary and Michon (1987) and Michon (1993) reveal that 
agroforestry is like a forest like land use system invented by local people over 
generations living at the margin of rainforest. 
Smallholder natural rubber area in Indonesia covers 3 million ha (hectares) 
out of which 2 million ha are rubber smallholder agroforests locally called “jungle 
rubber” (Director General of Estates, 2003).  The total area growth of rubber in 
Indonesia was 1.27 from 1970 to 2003 (Direktorat Jenderal Bina Produksi 
Perkebunan (2004). 
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The rubber-based agroforestry system yields are classified into three product 
groups namely; (1) latex (2) rubber wood and (3) yields of the intercrops. 
From the natural conservation point of view, Muara Kuamang agroforestry 
affords environmental benefit. The forest like structure of agroforestry allows the 
conservation of large part of natural forest biodiversity (de Foresta and Michon, 
1994). The mature agroforestry is made up of an intimate mixture of various tree 
crops managed by the smallholders. The trees shade out the crops, occupy 
different strata and occupy high value products such as fruits and high grade 
timber. As far as wild animals are concerned, agroforests harbor too many wild 
species and most of them are protected by the Indonesian law. These animals 
include; monkeys, gibbons, simang etc. 
Rubber agroforestry is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
relatively profitable and secondly, it is entirely smallholder-oriented. A jungle rubber 
plot produces approximately 600 kg (dry equivalent) of rubber per hectare per year 
(van Noordwijk et al. 1995. 
From the economic perspective, this land use system provides a wide range 
source of income to farmers, their neighborhood and actors along the trading chain 
(Levang, 1989; Dupain 1994; Bouamrane, 1996). Trees with about 65% of the tree 
community provide regular cash income from the harvesting and total sales. Fruit 
trees comprise almost a quarter of the tree community although not on a monthly 
basis, also provide additional cash income.  
The interesting part of the story lies in the way farmers initiate and develop 
this land use. In the first year, after slash and burn, subsistence food crops 
(primarily dry land paddy) are planted alongside rubber and fruit trees such as 
durian, duku, rambutan and other trees which have economic value for additional 
household income. Wherever possible, smallholder farmers plant any kind of 
vegetable for their own need.  
Crop mixture has economic importance as it makes the basis of succession 
of harvestable commercial products before positive cash flow (i.e. 6
th
 year for 
monoculture system and 9
th
 year for agroforestry system). Food crops (dry land 
paddy and vegetables) are the first yields that are harvested mainly used for daily 
consumption before other commercial crops are harvested. Farmers have 
additional annual income from harvesting these fruit trees.  
However, one of the major issues amongst smallholders under rubber 
agroforestry is how efficient and profitable their system is as compared to 
smallholder monoculture rubber production considering whether it is financially 
viable or not. Some of the evidences on this issue were considered, by analyzing 
the production structure and the arguments made for smallholders production 
efficiency and profitability. The expected outputs of the efficient production system 
are; good price, improved product quality and enhancement of a better welfare of 
farmers and communities. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The Farm Budget Analysis Approach 
 
Farm budget analysis is a commonly used economic tool for assessing 
performance of agriculture practices. This thesis employed the same technique that 
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was applied in other profitability assessments (e.g. ASB Indonesia project (Tomich 
et al, 1998; Budidarsono et al, 1998, 2000), which is Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM). 
As long as profitability calculation is concerned, the appropriate measure of 
profitability for long term investment is net present value (NPV), i.e., the present 
worth of benefit (revenues) less the present worth of the cost of tradable inputs and 
domestic factors of productions  (Gittinger, 1992).  Mathematically it is defined as: 
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where Bt is benefit at year t, Ct cost at year t, t is time denoting year and i is 
discount rate.  An investment (the practice of smallholder rubber agroforestry and 
smallholder rubber monoculture for over 30 years since establishment) is 
appraised as profitable if NPV is greater than 0.  
Profitability measured at social prices, so called social profitability, is an 
indicator of potential profitability. The divergence between private and social 
profitability shows how policies and market imperfections affect the financial 
incentives faced by smallholder farmers. 
Profitability analysis needs a detailed farm budget calculation and it is 
necessary to clarify the proper prices for calculating the costs and returns and the 
macroeconomic assumptions used in this assessment.  The study’s farm budget 
calculations were based on macroeconomic conditions that prevailed in Indonesia 
in the year 2007.   
 
Macroeconomic Parameters Used in 2007 were as follows; 
1) Exchange rate (Rp/USD)           9 164 
2) Wage rate in Jambi (Rp/person/day)*         20 796 
3) Real interest rate  
Private         10.0% 
Social           5.0% 
 Source: Bank Indonesia, 2008  
*Calculated wage rate for 2007 
  
 
 
The PAM Table Approach of Assessment 
 
Profitability as the first identity of accounting matrix is measured horizontally, 
across the columns of the matrix as demonstrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Policy analysis matrix 
 Revenues 
Cost 
Profits 
Tradable input Domestic factor 
Private prices A B C D1 
Social prices E F G H2 
Effect of divergences  I3 J4 K5 L6 
Source: Monke and Pearson (1995, p.19) 
 
 
 
Forum Pascasarjana Vol. 33 No. 1 Januari 2010: 67-77 
70 
Important policy parameters from policy analysis matrix 
The primary objective of constructing a PAM is to derive few important policy 
parameters for analysis.  The most commonly used parameters are Nominal 
Protection Coefficient on Tradable Output (NPCO), Nominal Protection Coefficient 
on Tradable Inputs (NPI), Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), Private Cost Ratio 
(PCR) and Domestic Resource Cost (DRC).  These parameters are closely related 
and are implicit in the PAM and hence can be calculated directly from the matrix. 
Since these are ratios, they can be used as a basis for comparison between 
different production activities. 
Nominal protection coefficient on tradable outputs (NPCO) 
NPCO is the ratio between private and social revenue of the output (i.e. the 
ratio of domestic market price of the product to its parity price at the farm-gate). In 
Table 1 above, NPCO = A/E. If NPCO >1, this indicates that the private price of 
output is greater than its parity price and hence producers are positively protected 
for the product. If NPCO < 1, it indicates that producers are implicitly taxed on the 
product. If NPCO = 1, it indicates a neutral situation. 
Nominal protection coefficient on tradable inputs (NPCI)  
NPI is the ratio of private to social cost of tradable inputs (i.e. the ratio of the 
private to the social values of all the tradable inputs). In Table 1 above, NPI = B/F. 
Therefore, if NPI >1, it indicates that producers are taxed when they buy tradable 
inputs. If NPI < 1, it indicates that they are subsidized and if NPI =1 it represents a 
neutral situation. 
Effective protection coefficient (EPC) 
EPC measures the total effects of intervention in both input and output 
markets. It is defined as the ratio of value-added measured at private prices to that 
at social prices. From Table 1 above, EPC = (A-B) / (E-F). If EPC > 1, it implies that 
the overall impact of the existing policy results in a net positive incentive to produce 
the commodity. EPC < 1 represents a net disincentive. EPC = 1 implies either no 
intervention or the net impact of various distortions in both the input and product 
markets results in a neutral effect on value added. 
Private cost ratio (PCR) 
The PCR is the ratio of domestic resource costs to value added in private 
prices. PCR = C/ (A-B). The ratio is an indication of how much a system can afford 
to pay domestic resources, including a normal return to capital, and still remain 
competitive. Any PCR less than one is an indicator of positive incentives for a given 
system. 
Domestic resource cost (DRC) 
This is the ratio of domestic factor cost, valued at social prices to the value-
added created by the same resources at social prices.  DRC = G/ (E-F). It is, in fact 
a social cost-benefit ratio, which helps in determining the desirability of certain 
domestic production system relative to the international market in terms of 
economic efficiency. The social cost is the opportunity cost of domestic resources 
involved in the production process. The social benefit is the value - added 
generated by the resources measured at social prices. If the cost is greater than 
the benefit (DRC>1), the production of the product is not desirable from the social 
point of view. 
On the other hand, if the cost is less than the benefit (DRC<1,) the 
production of that product is socially desirable. If the cost is equal to the benefit 
(DRC = 1), it is just worthwhile to produce the commodity. It also implies that with 
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regard to the commodity in question, the allocation of productive resources has 
reached an optimal point in the sense that, with the given economic regime, further 
reallocation of domestic resources would reduce welfare. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Since PAM is a static model and cannot capture the potential effects in 
prices and productivity, therefore a sensitivity analysis was conducted. The primary 
issue of the sensitivity analysis was estimated at 10% increase and 20% decrease 
in producer prices. This is based on author’s observations who perceived that 
smallholder agroforestry system’s lower yields are realized, particularly in the 
establishment phase, whereas with continuous production, yields increase as the 
system balances. This has a negative impact on prices of the final produce, and 
hence viability of rubber agroforestry. However, it can be argued that even if the 
price of rubber is likely to fall in the future, rubber agroforestry smallholders will still 
be in the range of their counterparts. Also, a fluctuating interest rate can have a 
significant impact on the system’s efficiency. Therefore social interest rate of loan 
to farmers was specified at 10% but currently it is 5.0% while the private interest 
rate was changed from the actual interest rate of 10% to an estimated rate of 15%. 
It is a subsidized credit aiming at promoting smallholder rubber farmers to get 
involved in development without any harmful financial burden for credit repayment. 
Devaluation in the value of the rupiah will result in better performance of 
agroforestry social production than social production of her counterpart. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Cost of Rubber Establishment 
 
The result of 30 years farm budget calculation (based on 2007 
macroeconomic assumption) figures out that financially, the total expenditure (NPV 
discounted) spent on rubber establishment under monoculture system was found 
to be Rp 19 144 million per hectare, whereas under rubber agroforestry system 
was Rp 8 583 million per hectare. 
What about the establishment costs for smallholders to develop rubber 
plantations? Or in another words, how much money do smallholder farmers need 
to develop their rubber plantations? Establishment costs here are defined as all 
inputs used to establish the systems, whereas the terms of “operational costs” are 
defined to be number of years of positive cash flow.  Therefore, using these 
definitions, the two systems were analyzed during their years of positive cash flow. 
The discounted operational costs for both systems are financially ranging from Rp 
24 797 million under agroforestry to Rp 48 168 million under monoculture, and 
economically ranging from Rp 37 977 million under smallholder agroforestry 
system and 75 224 under smallholder monoculture system. 
 
Return to Land and Return to Labor Assessment 
 
Returns to labor and returns to land assessment figures out that rubber 
establishment for both smallholders under rubber monoculture and smallholders 
under rubber agroforestry systems are profitable. Based on 2007 macroeconomic 
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parameters, returns to land per hectare at private prices are 46 737 million for 
smallholder monoculture system and Rp 18 254 million for rubber agroforestry 
system respectively.  Economically (farm budget calculation valued at social 
prices), returns to land for these systems are Rp 119 492 million (smallholder 
rubber monoculture system) and Rp 52 389 million (smallholder rubber 
agroforestry system) respectively. Similarly, for returns to labor, both systems 
provide more than double of the wage rate in Sumatra.  These estimates indicate 
that establishing rubber is very attractive for farmers to operate under both 
systems.  
 
Effect of Divergences or Policy Transfers 
 
It is noted that not all policies distort the allocation of resources; some 
policies however, endorse to improve efficiency by correcting for failure of product 
or factor markets to operate properly.  A negative transfer in the total revenue 
indicated that the smallholders were receiving less than the border parity price for 
the commodity.  A negative transfer in the domestic factors represents a positive 
transfer to the producers (smallholders under monoculture and agroforestry 
systems) of the commodity as this contributes to an increase in profit while a 
negative transfer in the tradable column indicated that smallholders are paying less 
than they would if distortions were not present compared to how it would have 
been if the result was positive. 
The value of output (revenues) transfer was negative for both rubber 
monoculture and rubber agroforestry and the NPCO of these systems was 0.47 
and 0.43 respectively.  These suggest the existence of substantial output transfer 
from farmers to the economy.  Apparently, it stemmed from two things, namely, 
failures in domestic market of output and overvalued official exchange rates. 
Monoculture farmer and agroforestry farmers actually respectively received only 
47% and 43% of the efficient (f.o.b.) price. 
The value of tradable input transfer was negative for both rubber 
monoculture and rubber agroforestry and the NPCI of these systems was 0.59 and 
0.69 respectively.  This indicates that producers in both systems are not taxed 
when they buy tradable inputs; hence here producers are protected because of 
government’s subsidy on the tradable inputs like fertilizer (i.e. Urea, TSP and KCI).  
According to the results, monoculture system looks to be benefiting from subsidies 
as compared to the agroforestry system.  Therefore other crops that are planted 
along side rubber in the agroforestry system also take advantage of the subsidy 
provided by the government.  These results are consistent with the negative 
divergences for both tradable input costs of both systems in the policy analysis 
matrix. 
The EPC values of 0.45 and 0.42 for rubber monoculture and rubber 
agroforestry respectively shows that the transfers of tradable outputs and tradable 
inputs were significant.  Output transfer from farmers to the economy was much 
higher than the input transfer from the economy to farmers. 
The net transfer was negative in both rubber monoculture and rubber 
agroforestry, but rubber monoculture provided much higher transfer than in rubber 
agroforestry.  This was caused by the higher output quantity in rubber monoculture 
in comparison with rubber agroforestry.  
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Impact of Change in Existing Policies 
 
Effects of an increase in producer prices 
An attempt was made to determine the effects of an increase in producer 
price on the efficiency of rubber production from a social point of view while 
comparing baseline scenario results with a 10% increase effect.  Therefore, with 
10% increase in producer prices, PCR and DRC for monoculture system 
decreased from 0.41 to 0.37 and 0.31 to 0.28 respectively as well as decreasing 
PCR and DRC for rubber agroforestry from 0.48 to 0.45 and 0.37 to 0.35 
respectively.  This indicates that even with a 10% increase in price of rubber, 
monoculture still remained more efficient than its counterpart.  EPC for rubber 
monoculture remained the same i.e. 0.45 as well as EPC for rubber agroforestry 
with 0.42 under both scenarios respectively.  Static EPC results under both 
systems are clear indicators that farmers are receiving net disincentives.  NPCO 
results for both results also remained the same under the two scenarios i.e. 0.47 
for monoculture and 0.43 for rubber agroforestry system which is a clear indicator 
that both systems are implicitly taxed. 
 
Exchange rate and interest rate 
The macroeconomic policies which are found to be relevant to smallholder 
rubber development are interest rate and exchange rate policies.  The annual 
interest rate of loan for farmers was specified at 10%, but currently the actual rate 
is 5.0%.  It is a subsidized credit aimed at promoting smallholder rubber farmers to 
get involved in development without any harmful financial burden for credit 
repayment. 
Exchange rates are managed by Bank Indonesia using floating exchange 
rate system.  It is obvious that the official (market) exchange rates of Rupiah per 
US dollar gradually increase from year to year.  The official exchange rate 2007 
was Rp 9 164 per US dollar.  In Indonesia, exchange rates tend to be overvalued.  
According to ICRAF expert, the overvaluation rate was approximately 10 percent.  
This is an indicator that monetary crisis has been taking place, whereby the 
exchange rates go up and down. 
With the new interest rate i.e. scenario C (i.e. 5% increase in private and 
social interest rate) in comparison with the baseline scenario (status quo), EPC 
increased from 0.45 to 0.52 for rubber monoculture and from 0.42 to 0.53 for 
rubber agroforestry.  The increasing EPC implies if the interest rates keep on 
increasing, then the two systems could easily lose their competitiveness but at this 
time, they are still competitive and this could be an emergence of efficient 
production technology and the impacts of economic reforms.  Since EPC values 
remained less than one it also implies that the net impact of government policies 
influencing product markets would lower private profits than if there were no 
commodity policies.  This is however not a complete indicator of incentives. 
From the PAM point of view, the appreciation of the real value of IDR implied 
that the f.o.b. price of product (in IDR) decreases in real terms (and so will the 
farm-gate price).  A decrease in price of rubber makes the crop undesirable from 
the social point of view (i.e. with a 20% decrease in price of rubber DRC increases 
from 0.35 (agroforestry) and 0.28 (monoculture) under scenario A (i.e. 10% 
increase in the price of rubber) where it is efficient with better results, to 0.39 
(monoculture) and 0.42 (agroforestry) under scenario B (20% decrease in the price 
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of rubber).  According to the results it was becoming undesirable for farmers but 
more under agroforestry than monoculture system.  The opposite is also true (i.e. 
with a depreciating RER, profits realized in excess of normal returns to domestic 
resources will decrease).  It is important to note that on the other hand, an 
appreciating real value of the IDR implies that the c.i.f. prices of inputs (in IDR) will 
also decrease.  However, the DRC is insensitive to changes in parity prices of 
tradable inputs under monoculture than its counterpart.  Costs of non-tradable 
elements such as labour, warehousing, port charges, and transportation outweigh 
costs of tradable elements.  Thus, the overall effect (combining effect on produce 
price and effect on input price) is a disincentive to exporting the crop. However, it is 
worth noting that Indonesia’s inflation rate is on a steady decline. 
 
Effects of policy distortions 
The net policy effect was negative for both systems in all scenarios, which is 
a clear indication that the overall, policies are reducing net private profitability 
below net social profitability.  This suggests that in general government policies are 
taxing agricultural output.  The gap between the two, nevertheless, varies widely 
signaling different policy pressures between two systems. 
The output price transfers shows a significant gap between social and 
private (market) producer prices, with market (private) prices being lower in both 
systems.  The gap between private and social output prices is narrower for both 
rubber monoculture system and rubber agroforestry system.  This is an indication 
that private prices in both monoculture and agroforestry are comparable and 
competitive to the world market prices with effective protection coefficients ranging 
from 0.42 to 0.54 under rubber agroforestry and 0.45 to 0.52 for rubber 
monoculture with change in policies calculated for rubber monoculture and rubber 
agroforestry respectively. 
The existing gap between private and social output prices widened 
significantly and the reason for this could be due to estates growing and exporting 
rubber offers low prices to smallholder farmers.  The world price fluctuation for 
rubber is a big threat to Jambi’s smallholder rubber industry.  The export tax 
previously imposed on all export crops reduced small profit previously received by 
farmers in this industry.  These factors are part of the explanation for the rising and 
falling of market prices for rubber.  When the prices of rubber fall, smallholders 
under rubber agroforestry reallocate factors of production (i.e. capital and labor) to 
other crops and return them back when the prices of rubber increase again in order 
to meet the daily expenses.  Therefore price fluctuations affect the production of 
rubber under agroforestry system whereas; smallholders under monoculture 
system maintain their tapping and maintenance schedule for future benefits. 
The study found, overall increase in private input prices.  This stemmed from 
poor infrastructure and lack of competition in the transport sector resulted into very 
high transport costs and inflating private input prices.  Input traders charge high 
market prices as they struggle to recover their marketing costs (inflated by high 
transport cost).  It therefore means that producers are unnecessarily paying more 
for inputs than they normally would if the transport industry was competitive. Also, 
the sales tax imposed on inputs such as chemicals, fertilizers (e.g. KCI) inflate the 
input market price, pushing it above the social price.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
Conclusions 
 
(1) This study being an application of a policy analysis matrix under two 
competing systems (i.e. smallholder rubber agroforestry and smallholder 
rubber monoculture) in Jambi, DRC and PCR indicators were found to be 
less than 1 under the baseline scenario which shows that rubber is efficiently 
produced in both systems but more efficiently produced under monoculture 
than its counterpart. Interestingly enough, these results are consistent with 
the government policies of achieving smallholder’s production and 
subsidization of inputs (e.g. fertiliser).  
(2) Since PAM is a static model, which cannot capture the potential changes in 
prices, costs and productivity, the rankings were subject to changes in the 
market condition. In order to overcome the limitation, a set of sensitivity 
analyses were carried out by changing farm gate prices and real interest rate 
(i.e. price of rubber and real interest rate both at private and social prices). 
The general conclusion from this analysis is that, even with 10% increase in 
the price of rubber and 5% increase in social and private interest rates, 
smallholder rubber agroforestry system did not out-compete its counterpart 
efficiently and profitably thus making monoculture the best option if farmers 
are looking for the best profitable system.  
(3) Based on farm budget calculation, the study revealed that smallholder 
rubber monoculture system in managing the plantation during rubber 
establishment had higher returns, employed more labor and also more 
profitable than smallholder rubber agroforestry traditional systems. An effort 
to prolong the plantation stage brings in significant changes in the farmers 
economy and the neighborhood as it created more employment 
opportunities in the villages. 
(4) Price distortions reduce the production of rubber under smallholder rubber 
agroforestry system. With a 20% decrease in prices of rubber reduces the 
systems efficiency (i.e. from 0.37 DRC under baseline scenario to 0.42 
under scenario B for smallholder rubber agroforestry system) and (0.31 DRC 
under baseline scenario to 0.39 DRC under scenario B for smallholder 
rubber monoculture system) thus making rubber more less desirable under 
scenario B for smallholder rubber agroforestry system. When the price of 
rubber falls, smallholders under rubber agroforestry system reallocate 
factors of production (i.e. capital and labor) to other crops thus leaving 
rubber unattended to in order to meet their daily expenses. Therefore 
smallholders resume tapping when there is an increase in rubber prices 
again. Therefore price fluctuations affect the production of rubber under 
agroforestry system whereas; Smallholders under monoculture system 
maintain their tapping and rubber maintenance schedule for future benefits. 
(5) While more intensive monoculture rubber offers better rubber productivity 
(yield and profitability), it also requires much higher capital and input that is 
beyond reach for smallholders under rubber agroforestry especially during 
the establishment stage. 
(6) Finally, although rubber agroforestry system has the capacity to provide 
smallholder farmers with diversified income and a range of non timber forest 
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products than monoculture for economic benefits; monoculture stands out to 
be a better option.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
(1) Given the relatively low yields of rubber from smallholder farmers under 
agroforestry system and the disincentive effect of the overvalued exchange 
rate, a special credit scheme is necessary for farmers if rubber production is 
to be more efficient and attractive under smallholder agroforestry system. 
(2) The increasing profitability and efficiency of rubber with higher price relative 
to other crops may have a negative effect on food production and vice versa 
under smallholder rubber agroforestry system. If the profit gap is deemed 
unacceptable by the government, it should be off-set by increasing the 
official price of both food crops relative to that of rubber in order to maintain 
the production of other crops under agroforestry system. 
(3) If smallholder rubber agroforestry system is to be efficient compared to its 
counterpart, better policies and high yielding varieties have to be put in 
place. 
(4) Although Price fluctuations are normal for any commodity, rubber is a volatile 
commodity. Major rubber producing provinces in Indonesia like Jambi need 
sophisticated financial instruments e.g. providing price fluctuation insurance 
to farmers. This requires complicated rural banking arrangements and well-
organized markets which Indonesia government must put in place. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
 
This study has led some useful findings and conclusions about improving 
economic efficiency and distortions affecting smallholder rubber farmers. However, 
there are critical areas that need further research and these are; 
(1) Switch from one crop to another exists (i.e.  from rubber to other crops like 
Palm oil);  
(2) Credit intended for agricultural production activities, is diverted to non rubber 
farming activities for other activities like weddings other than rubber 
production resulting into a decline in crop yields and loss of income, causing 
households to default loan repayment 
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